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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN, 
Appellant. 
v. 
GUENTHER JACOBSEN 
Appellee. 
Appeal No.: 20080802-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) and UT. CODE ANN. §78A-4-103(2)(h) provide this Court with 
jurisdiction over this appeal resulting from the Final Decree of Divorce filed on August 25, 2008 
(the "Decree"), (exhibit A) entered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, presiding. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err in finding that the Divorce Agreement was an enforceable agreement? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "We determine the existence of a contract. . .by resorting to 
principles of law; therefore, we grant no deference to the trial court that originally decided 
the matter." Carter v. Sorenson. 2004 UT 33, 116, 90 P.3d 637; see, Nunley v. Westates 
Casing Servs.. Inc.. 1999 UT 100,1117, 989 P.2d 1077. "Whether a contract exists between 
parties is a question of law; therefore, we review the trial court's conclusion of law under a 
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correction of error standard." Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v. Quintek. 834 P.2d 582, 583 
(Utah App. 1992), citing Bailey v. Call. 767 P.21d 138, 139 (Utah App), cert denied, Illy P.2d 45 
(Utah 1989); accord, Scarf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). "In determining 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's findings, c[w]e review the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings and affirm if there is a 
reasonable basis for doing so."' Ockey v. Lehmer. 2008 UT 37, lf34, 189 P.3 51, citing 
Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah App 1993); see also, Grayson Roper 
Ltd. P'ship v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
ISSUE II: Alternatively, if the Divorce Agreement is enforceable, did the trial court err in offsetting the 
proceeds for the sale of the Terra Vista home, under what it found to be an enforceable agreement, with 
monies paid for the purpose of retiring the mortgage when (a) the agreement had been in effect for 2 years prior 
to such payments being made; (b) the plain language of the agreement indicated that, absent a pay-out in 
September of 2004, the equity would be divided equally among the parties upon properly sale closure and (c) 
did it err in determining that Appellee's prior inheritance monies which he paid into the Terra Vista home be 
returned to him in full? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Interpretation of contract terms is a question of law." 
Holladay Duplex Management Co.. L.L.C. v. Howells. 2002 UT App 125, 112, 47 P.3d 104, 
citing Canyon Meadows. 2001 UT App 414, 1J7, 40 P.3d 1148; see also, Dixon v. Pro Image. 
Inc.. 1999 UT 89, Hi4, 987 P.2d 48. "We review the trial court's rulings on questions of law 
for correctness." Id., see, Canyon Meadows at H7. "[T]he trial court has wide discretion in 
property division, and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of 
discretion can be demonstrated." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 305-306 (Utah 
1988). 
ISSUE II I : Did the trial court err in awarding Appellee equity in house for payments made pursuant to 
the Divorce Agreement following signing of agreement up to and including the sale of the Terra Vista 
properly; awarding Appellee all interest accrued on the escrow containing the proceeds from the sale of the 
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Terra Vista property; and did the trial court enter conflicting findings in determining that the parties 
separated their financial accounts in May 2001 ? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "p]he trial court has wide discretion in property division, 
and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be 
demonstrated." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 305-306 (Utah 1988). 
ISSUE IV: Did the trial court err in using the new values (instead of depreciated values) for major 
household items and the 2002 VW Golf in ordering Veronica to pay Guenther one half the value of those 
items? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[T]he trial court has wide discretion in property division, 
and its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion can be 
demonstrated." Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 305-306 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. U.C.A. § 30-3-3(1) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties met in Decatur, Alabama, on December 12, 2006, while both were 
working for Hexcel Corporation, and were married on April 18, 1997. R0393 at pp. 7-8. On 
June 2, 1997, appellant Veronica Jacobsen ("Veronica") moved to Kearns, Utah (hereinafter, 
the "Gingerwood Home"), to live with appellee Guenther Jacobsen ("Guenther"). Id. 
The Gingerwood Home in Kearns, Utah, was owned by Guenther at that time. Id. at p. 44. 
Veronica resigned her position in Alabama making approximately $46,000 per year, and sold 
her home for a profit of $6,000, which was placed in a joint account. Id. at pp. 10-11. 
In 1999, the couple began construction on a home in Sandy (hereinafter, the "Terra 
Vista Home"), mortgaging the Gingerwood Home for approximately $60,000 to purchase 
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the lot in Sandy, which cost approximately $81,000. R0393 at pp. 43-44, 48. The remaining 
$21,000 came from the couple's joint account. Id. at 45. Veronica's name was placed on the 
Gingerwood Home on or about June 18th or 19th, 1999, so the parties could purchase the lot 
for the Terra Vista Home. Id. at 45-46. In October of 1999, the couple fired their contractor 
and Veronica managed the remainder of the construction until its completion in April of 
2000. Id. at 48. The sale of the Gingerwood Home reflects both Veronica and Guenther as 
owners and sellers. Id. at p. 47. 
On May 14, 2001, the parties signed and notari2ed a one page document titled Divorce 
Agreement (the "Divorce Agreement"), which reflected the parties' agreements to 
distribution of some property. R0077. The Divorce Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" and incorporated herein by this reference. Approximately three and one half years later, 
on October 13, 2005, Veronica, filed a Petition for Divorce (the "Petition"), requesting the 
termination of her marriage to Guenther. R0001. Concerning the Terra Vista Home, 
Veronica requested that (a) Guenther be awarded the Terra Vista Home; (b) Veronica be 
entitled to one-half the value of the equity in the Terra Vista home valued at the time of the 
Decree of Divorce by a certified appraiser of Veronica's choosing, and; (c) Veronica be 
ordered to sign a Quit Claim Deed for the Terra Vista Home within ten (10) days of entry of 
the Decree of Divorce and (d) Guenther be ordered to pay Veronica one-half of the equity 
within thirty (30) days of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. R0003. The Petition did not 
seek alimony from Guenther conditioned on Guenther performing certain requests. On 
October 26, 2005, Guenther filed his Answer and Counterclaim. R0011. Concerning the Terra 
Vista Home, Guenther requested that, based on the parties' separation in January 2003, it 
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was just for the parties to be awarded equity based upon the value of the equity accrued from 
the time they moved into the residence until their separation on or about January 1, 2003. 
R0015. Guenther requested the value be determined by a mutually agreed upon appraiser. Id. 
On October 3, 2006, the parties came before Commissioner Patrick T. Casey for a 
pretrial settlement conference. R0218. The commissioner determined mediation had failed, 
the parties were unable to resolve the issues, and certified the matter for trial. Id. The 
commissioner determined the following issues for trial: (1) Veronica's claim for one-half the 
equity in the Terra Vista Home and how the Divorce Agreement applies thereto, which was 
further complicated by other factors; (2) the parties' vehicles and Veronica's request for 
balancing of the values in the vehicles; (3) the financial accounts and their valuation dates to 
be divided equally; (4) Veronica's request for alimony, particularly since she experiences a 
shortfall every month; (5) the issue of the repayment of monies taken from the financial 
account; and (6) attorney's fees. R0218-0220, 0223. 
On January 31, 2007, the Petition came for trial (the "Trial"). R0393 - Tr. at p. 3. On 
February 2, 2007, the trial court rendered its oral findings. R0277. The trial court concluded 
that the Divorce Agreement was an enforceable agreement and determined to enforce it. 
R0394 at p. 3. The trial court based this conclusion on its findings that (a) Veronica testified 
that the Divorce Agreement was her idea, she drafted it, and both parties appeared before a 
notary to sign it; (b) Veronica testified she had no specific immediate intent to implement the 
Divorce Agreement, but previously attempted to fill out paperwork for divorce; (c) 
Veronica's child Isaac required a secure place to live until he completed High School; and, 
(d) while the Divorce Agreement did not address all of the parties' financial assets, it did 
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address a substantial number of assets and how they should be distributed. Id. at pp. 4-5. 
The trial court found that there was performance on the Divorce Agreement by the 
parties. R0394 at p. 5. Veronica's name was removed from the Terra Vista Home's mortgage, 
Guenther continued to make monthly mortgage payments and, while Veronica temporarily 
moved to Hong Kong, Isaac remained in the Terra Vista Home until August 2004. Id, at pp. 
5-6. Hence, the trial court concluded elements of the contract had been met in that both 
parties participated in the drafting and revision of the Divorce Agreement and had reached a 
meeting of the minds. Id. at p. 6. The trial court found that the lack of an actual filing of a 
divorce action did not take away from the enforceability of the contract and, since the 
Divorce Agreement did not provide a precise date by which the Terra Vista Home was to be 
sold, that there would be equal division of equity whenever the sale occurred. Id. at pp. 6-8. 
The trial court found that the way in which the parties filed their tax returns after 
signing the Divorce Agreement demonstrated the parties' intent to keep their finances 
separate. Id. at p. 9. The trial court found that the distribution of the 401-K and pension 
plans was contemplated by the Divorce Agreement, which indicates that they would be 
divided equally. Id. Furthermore, the Divorce Agreement disclaimed Veronica's right to 
seek alimony. Id. While the trial court noted the Divorce Agreement does not make 
provisions concerning the distribution of personal property, including stock options, this 
failure did not take away from the Divorce Agreement's enforceability, since it in large 
measure addressed the distribution of assets. Id. 
The trial court determined that Veronica was effectively gifted with one-half the value 
of the Gingerwood Home, irrespective of the fact that Guenther had paid for it in full before 
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the marriage. R0394 at p. 10. Hence, the trial court found that the Gingerwood Home was 
marital property and thus went into the interest of the Terra Vista Home. Id. at pp. 10-11. 
The trial court concluded that the joint accounts became separate after May 2001, 
when Veronica began depositing her paychecks into a different account. R0394 at pp. 11-12. 
The trial court found that the parties remained signatories on each other's accounts as a 
convenience to Veronica. Id. The trial court concluded that the parties intended to retain 
their funds as separate assets after May 25, 2001, and that Veronica acted improperly by 
withdrawing money from the joint account. Id. at p. 15. Thus, the trial court held that 
Guenther was entitled to deduct the money taken from the account from the equity in the 
Terra Vista Home. Id. The trial court found that Guenther was entitled to the fix-up 
expenses he incurred when selling the Terra Vista Home, and that Guenther was entitled to 
reimbursement for paying off Veronica's debt when the parties married. Id. at p. 15-16. 
Therefore, the trial court concluded that different dates needed to be attached to the valuing 
of different assets. R0394 at p. 18. The trial court found that the checking and savings 
accounts were separated on May 25, 2001, and monies held in the respective accounts were 
separate property of the parties thereafter. Id. at p. 18. The trial court found the valuation of 
the Terra Vista Home as of the date of its sale, which was contemplated by the Divorce 
Agreement. Id. 
The trial court determined that the income tax filings and refunds had already been 
divided between the parties equitably. R0394 at p. 20. The trial court determined the value of 
stock options and pension as of the date of divorce and awarded each party half interest in 
the other's pension and stock options. Id. The trial court found that Veronica needed 
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minor assistance with her attorney fees and awarded Veronica $2,500 in attorney's fees. Id. at 
pp. 20-21. 
On June 19, 2008, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(the "FOF/COL") R0367. On August 25, 2008, the Decree was entered. R0401. The 
Decree granted the parties divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. R0402. 
Veronica's claim to Guenther's inheritance was categorically rejected, including the portion 
of inheritance Guenther used to retire the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. Id. The 
Divorce Agreement was deemed valid and enforceable, with any ambiguity resolved against 
Veronica as the drafter thereof. Veronica was determined to have waived claim to alimony 
and denied such request. Id. The date of May 25, 2001, was utilized for the purpose of 
separating the joint financial accounts, with Guenther awarded $29,777.20, an amount that 
Veronica removed from Guenther's account in . Id. This amount was deducted from 
Veronica's share of the sales proceeds of the Terra Vista Home. Id. The date of January 31, 
2007, was utilized for the date of valuation for Guenther's stock options accumulated during 
the marriage, and each party was awarded one-half the value of the stock as of that date. The 
date of January 31, 2007, was also utilized as the date of valuation of the parties' pension 
plans, 401ks, and any other retirements. Id. Thus, Veronica was awarded $68,829.64 
withdrawn from Guenther's 401k plan and Guenther was ordered to receive one-half of 
$12,000 cashed out from Veronica's retirement. Id. The trial court determined Veronica 
would receive an offset of $28,414.82 from the monies she was ordered to pay to Guenther 
from her share of the sales proceeds of the Terra Vista Home. R0402-0403. The proceeds of 
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the Terra Vista Home sale had been placed in escrow when it sold and amounted to 
$488,949.11. R0393atp. 51. 
The date of August 17, 2006, which was the Terra Vista Home's date of sale, was 
utilized for the division of equity. R0403. The trial court first determined Guenther would 
receive $241,465.52 outright from the proceeds, which represented the extra payments he 
made to retire the mortgage and one-half the cost of repairs to the home prior to the division 
of the sales proceeds. Id, The trial court rewarded the remaining sales proceeds of 
$247,483.50 to be divided equally between the parties. Id, However, out of the remaining 
sales proceeds, Veronica was ordered to pay Guenther (a) $29,777.29 for the wrongfully 
taken money from his account; (b) $4,134.25 as Guenther's one-half interest in the major 
personal property retained by Veronica; (c) $5,137.50 as Guenther's one-half interest in the 
value of the Vehicle; (d) attorney's fees in the amount of $2,117.50, due to Veronica 
removing money as indicated from Guenther's account; and (e) $14,417.21 to reimburse 
Guenther for paying her pre-marital debt. Guenther was ordered to pay Veronica $47,417 
for her one-half interest in the parties' retirement accounts and stock options, and attorney's 
fees in the amount of $2,500. R0403-0404. Hence, the trial court ordered the distribution of 
the Terra Vista Home escrow in the amount of $117,914.38 to Veronica and $371,034.72 to 
Guenther. R0404. On September 22, 2008, Veronica filed her Notice of Appeal, R0445. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Material facts relative to each issue are contained in the argument section for each 
argument post so as to avoid repetition. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In its analysis of contracts between spouses, this Court has determined the following: 
In addressing the stipulated divorce decree between Wife and 
Husband, we first "acknowledge[ ] the general authority of 
spouses ... to arrange property rights by a contract that is 
recogni2ed and enforced by a court in the event of a divorce." 
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75,1f24, 984 P.2d 987. And although the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "contracts between spouses 
... are not necessarily judged on the same terms as contracts 
executed by persons operating at 'arm's length,"' we note that 
the court never set forth a different test or standard of review 
for such contracts. Id. Instead, the court has stated the general 
principle that "spouses ... may make binding contracts with each 
other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the 
negotiations are conducted in good faith ... and do not 
unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory 
duties." Id. at ^25. In effect, the parties "are held to the highest 
degree of good faith, honesty, and candor," and "agreements 
concerning the disposition of property owned by the parties at 
the time of their marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud, 
coercion, or material nondisclosure." Id. at [^24 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
Sweetv. Sweet 2006 UT App. 216, f3,138 P.3d 63. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[a] binding contract can exist only where there 
has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms." 
BunneU v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) citing AUen v. Bissinger and 
Co.. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 31 A.L.R. 376. 
In May of 2001, the parties signed the document tided "Divorce Agreement." 
However, the parties did not end their relationship, and Veronica did not actuaUy file for 
divorce until October of 2005. When this matter came before the trial court, the Divorce 
Agreement was held to be a binding and enforceable contract, and the division of the marital 
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property was made accordingly. However, the trial court's reliance upon the Divorce 
Agreement was in error as the Divorce Agreement was not entered into in contemplation of 
divorce as is evidenced throughout the brief, and was not made in good faith by the parties. 
However, should this Court determine that the Divorce Agreement is enforceable, 
then the trial court erred in offsetting the proceeds from the sale of the Terra Vista Home. 
This Court has held, "[i]t is [a] court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the plain language of the covenants." Holladay Duplex Management Co.. L.L.C 
v. Howells. 2002 UT App 125, 117, 47 P.3d 104, citing Swenson v. Erickson. 2000 UT 16, 
1111, 998 P.2d 807. "Furthermore, [s]uch language is to be taken in its ordinary and generally 
understood and popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement nor the 
words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon." Id,, citing 
Freeman v. Gee. 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155,163 (1967). 
Under the Divorce Agreement, Veronica's name was to be kept on the Terra Vista 
property, her name was to be removed from the mortgage, Guenther was to make all 
payments on the mortgage at least through August 2004, and (under 3.1) the equity was to be 
split "equally" when the Terra Vista house was sold. Under the plain language of the 
Divorce Agreement, any payment made by Guenther to the Terra Vista property was a gift 
to the marriage. The trial court decided, however, to award Guenther an offset for paying 
off the mortgage, and for improvements and maintenance he claimed on the home. Veronica 
was given no offset for her maintenance and improvements on the home, and the Divorce 
Agreement had no provision for giving credit for payments made on the property. The trial 
court's decision to give Guenther equity credit for additional payments he made to the Terra 
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Vista home ignored the plain language of the Divorce Agreement, and ignored the fact of 
Veronica and he holding the tide joindy as husband and wife. The trial court's decision 
denied Veronica the benefit of the bargain she made with the Divorce Agreement. 
This Court has stated that, ". . .the doctrine of construing ambiguities in a contract 
against the drafter functions as a kind of tie-breaker, used as a last resort by the fact-finder 
after the receipt and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic evidence has left unresolved what 
the parties actually intended." Wilburn v. Interstate Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 
1988). In the instant matter, the fact that Veronica was the drafter of the Divorce Agreement 
has been construed against her, even though the parties agreed to an agreement in the form 
later changed and countered by Guenther. The mere fact that Veronica drafted the initial 
agreement—later countered when Guenther made changes to such agreement—should not 
be held against her. 
This Court has held that, "Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer his or her 
interest in separately acquired property into the marital estate." Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 
UT App. 373, 1J22, 993 P.2d 887 citing UT. CODE ANN. §30-2-3. Bradford continues, "[a] 
transfer of otherwise separate property to a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is 
generally presumed to be a gift, see 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 103(a), at 397 (1991) {citing 
Kramer v. Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157,159 (Mo.Ct.App.1986)), and, when coupled with an evident 
intent to do so, effectively changes the nature of that property to marital property." Id., citing 
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 307-08 (Utah 1988). In the instant matter, the trial 
court erred in giving Guenther the amount of all payments he made to the Terra Vista 
property, including those stemming from his inheritance, as an offset on the marital property 
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because any payments made to the marital property changed the nature of those payments 
into marital property. 
"Generally, in a divorce proceeding c[e]ach party is presumed to be entitled to all of 
his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.'" Bradford v. Bradford. 
1999 UT App. 373, TJ26, 993 P.2d 887 citing Thomas v. Thomas. 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25, 
987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah Ct.App.1999). Hence, "[a]n unequal division of marital property, 
however, is only justified when the trial court 'memorialize[s] in commendably detailed 
findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Id. at f^ 27. In the 
instant matter, the Divorce Agreement contemplated for the equity in the Terra Vista Home 
to be split equally, with Guenther paying the mortgage through at least August of 2004. 
Therefore, it was an error for the trial court to determine that the Divorce Agreement was 
enforceable, but that Guenther should be awarded the payments he made on the mortgage 
when the Divorce Agreement anticipated such payments. The trial court also erred in its 
division of the interest on the proceeds from the Terra Vista Home and the division of the 
parties financial accounts, since such division was also inequitable and not in accordance 
with the one-half split as set forth in the Divorce Agreement. 
The Trial Court also failed to take into account the evidence actually presented to it 
and admitted concerning the current values of marital property and Veronica's car, instead 
deciding unilaterally to use 7 year old and 2 year old values, respectively, and forcing 
Veronica to pay half those inflated values instead of those current values actually submitted 
as evidence. This was an abuse of discretion. 
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Veronica should also be awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal, as a prevailing 
party on appeal who was awarded her attorney fees by the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE DIVORCE 
AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND BINDING ON THE PARTIES, A N D 
CLAIMING THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
AGAINST VERONICA. 
A. The Divorce Agreement is Not Enforceable. 
In its analysis of contracts between spouses, this Court has determined the following: 
In addressing the stipulated divorce decree between Wife and 
Husband, we first "acknowledge[ ] the general authority of 
spouses ... to arrange property rights by a contract that is 
recogni2ed and enforced by a court in the event of a divorce." 
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, f24, 984 P.2d 987. And although the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "contracts between spouses 
... are not necessarily judged on the same terms as contracts 
executed by persons operating at 'arm's length,'" we note that 
the court never set forth a different test or standard of review 
for such contracts. Id. Instead, the court has stated the general 
principle that "spouses ... may make binding contracts with each 
other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the 
negotiations are conducted in good faith ... and do not 
unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory 
duties." Id. at ^[25. In effect, the parties "are held to the highest 
degree of good faith, honesty, and candor," and "agreements 
concerning the disposition of property owned by the parties at 
the time of their marriage are valid, so long as there is no fraud, 
coercion, or material nondisclosure." Id. at f^24 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
Sweetv. Sweet 2006 UT App. 216, f3,138 P.3d 63. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, "[a] binding contract can exist only where there 
has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms." 
BunneU v. Bilk 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) citing AUen v. Bissinger and 
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Co.. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 31 A.L.R. 376. In Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. 
Exchange, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that, depending on the facts of the case, a 
failure of a condition precedent to contract formation necessitates the conclusion that no 
contract was ever formed. Ibid, 2008 UT App 315,1J40,193 P.3d 650; see, generally, McBride-
Williams v. Huard. 2004 UT 21, 1113, 94 P.3d 175 (" 'Condition precedent' is defined as an 
act or event, other than a lapse of time, that must exist or occur before a duty to perform 
something promised arises." (emphasis added)(additional internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see, e.g., Bilanzich v. Lonetti 2007 UT 26, Ifll n. 4, 160 P.3d 1041 (noting that, under the 
facts of that case, "the failure of the condition precedent invalidated the entire [contract]"). 
In the instant case, the trial court determined to enforce the Divorce Agreement in 
determining the distribution of property. The trial court based this determination on the 
evidence presented at trial as follows: Veronica testified she left her copy of the Divorce 
Agreement with Guenther when she left the Terra Vista Home to reside in Hong Kong. 
R0393 at p. 28. Veronica testified that she initiated the draft, but Guenther finalized it. Id. at 
p. 30. Veronica testified she wanted the Divorce Agreement because in December of 2000, 
Guenther brought home another woman. Id. 
A few months later, Veronica asked Guenther to leave, and he moved out in April 
2001. R0393 at p. 28. On May 14, 2001, the parties signed the Divorce Agreement. 
Guenther was not a citizen of the United States but had applied for a green card at the time 
of the Divorce Agreement. R0393 at p. 28. Veronica had participated with Guenther in 
applying for the green card. Id. However, Veronica became worried about Guenther's ex-
girlfriend in Germany. Id. at pp. 30-31. Veronica did not see a divorce lawyer after signing 
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the Divorce Agreement and was unaware whether Guenther had seen a lawyer. Id. at p. 31. 
Veronica did not intend to divorce Guenther at the time she signed the Divorce Agreement. 
Id. Veronica testified that, after signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther was nicer to her 
than before. Id. at p. 32. Veronica testified she was worried Guenther had used her to obtain 
a green card. Id. 
Veronica testified that Guenther removed her name from the first mortgage on the 
Terra Vista Home, which is in accordance with the Divorce Agreement. R0393 at pp. 32-33. 
Veronica testified that Guenther moved back into the Terra Vista Home when she moved to 
Hong Kong in January of 2003. Id. p. 34. Prior to moving to Hong Kong, Veronica paid the 
utility bills and maintenance concerning the Terry Vista Home. Id. Veronica and Guenther 
shared the costs of any damage to the Terra Vista Home. Id. at pp. 34-35. Terra Vista was 
not placed for sale until November 2005, a month after Veronica filed for divorce. Id. 
At the time the parties signed the Divorce Agreement, there was no discussion 
between the parties concerning a reduction of what Veronica received by an amount of 
Guenther's inheritance. R0393 at pp. 35-36. The parties did not discuss any reduction in 
what Veronica would receive from the sale of Terra Vista based on use of premarital or 
separate funds. Id. at p. 36. Veronica testified that, after Guenther moved out in April 
2001, she saw him at the Terra Vista Home once every weekend or more. Id. 
Veronica gave Guenther her copy of the Divorce Agreement when she left for Hong 
King because she considered it "meaningless." Id. at pp. 36-37. Veronica testified that, 
although they were separated, she and Guenther had relations, continued to present 
themselves as husband and wife, and took vacations together. Id. at p. 37. Veronica testified 
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that, when Guenther traveled with Veronica on her business trip to Korea in February 2004, 
she introduced him as her husband to her family. Id. at p. 39. Upon Guenther's request, 
Veronica took vacation time in October 2004 for thirty-six (36) days to take care of 
Guenther when he had open heart surgery. Id. at pp. 40-41. 
Veronica testified she did not intend to divorce Guenther. R0393 at p. 83. Veronica 
did not file a motion with the trial court to void the Divorce Agreement. Id. Veronica 
entered into the Divorce Agreement voluntarily. Id. Prior to signing the Divorce Agreement, 
Veronica had prepared some divorce documents online in February 2001 which were never 
filed or finalized, and the Divorce Agreement was in contemplation of that potential filing. 
Id. Veronica and Guenther did not divide their financial accounts upon signing the Divorce 
Agreement. Id. at p. 84. After signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther paid the taxes, 
insurance, and mortgage payment on the Terra Vista Home, even while Veronica lived there 
and he did not. Id. at p. 97. Veronica testified that the reason for this was because Guenther 
earned more money than Veronica, and she could not afford the mortgage. Id. The Divorce 
Agreement reflects that Guenther would pay the mortgage of the Terra Vista Home. Id. at 
pp. 97-98. 
In June, 2005, Guenther paid the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home in full. R0393 at 
p. 141. Guenther testified his name was the only one on the mortgage for the Terra Vista 
Home. Id. In 2002, Guenther testified that the parties filed joint tax returns and split the 
return equally. Id. at p. 156. Guenther testified that, before moving to Hong Kong, Veronica 
returned her copy of the Divorce Agreement to him and said it was a useless paper. Id. 
Guenther testified that Veronica made a draft and they made adjustments, keeping the scope 
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of the Divorce Agreement the same. Id. at p. 191. Guenther acknowledged that the Divorce 
Agreement did not address personal property, such as the washer, dryer, and vehicles. Id. at 
pp. 191-192. 
Guenther testified that his understanding of equity took into consideration 
"contributions, premarital, inheritance and so on." Id. at pp. 194-195. However, Guenther 
did not discuss this with Veronica before signing the Divorce Agreement and believed there 
was no need to discuss that." Id. at p. 195. Guenther testified that when he signed the 
"divorce agreement," he was not contemplating a divorce. Id. at p. 198, 11. 6-10. Upon 
signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther was not contemplating divorce and did not move 
in that direction. Id. at p. 198. Guenther testified that there was nothing in the Divorce 
Agreement that indicated the money earned by the parties after May 2001 was not separate 
property. Id. at pp. 215-216. Guenther testified that, although the parties had separated their 
financial accounts upon entering the Divorce Agreement, both parties had access to the 
other's accounts. Id. at pp. 216-217. 
In its oral findings, the trial court based its conclusion to enforce the Divorce 
Agreement upon its findings that (a) Veronica testified that the Divorce Agreement was her 
idea, she drafted it, and both parties appeared before a notary to sign it; (b) Veronica testified 
she had no specific immediate intent to implement the Divorce Agreement, but previously 
attempted to fill out paperwork for divorce; (c) Isaac required a secure place to live until he 
completed High School; and, (d) while the Divorce Agreement did not address all of the 
parties' financial assets, it did address a substantial number of assets and how they should be 
distributed. R0394 at pp. 4-5. 
18 
The trial court found that there was performance on the Divorce Agreement by the 
parties. Id. at p. 5. Veronica's name was removed from the Terra Vista Home's mortgage, 
Guenther continued to make monthly mortgage payments, and, while Veronica temporarily 
moved to Hong Kong, Isaac remained in the Terra Vista Home until August of 2004. Id. at 
pp. 5-6. 
Hence, the trial court concluded that partial performance of the contract had been 
undertaken in that both parties participated in the drafting and revision of the Divorce 
Agreement and had reached a meeting of the minds. Id. at p. 6. The trial court found that the 
parties accepted certain legal detriments: Guenther accepted responsibility for the mortgage, 
and Veronica remained on the title of the Terra Vista Home. Id. The trial court found that 
the actual filing of divorce did not take away from the enforceability of the contract. Id. 
The trial court found that, since the Divorce Agreement did not provide a precise 
date by which the Terra Vista Home was to be sold, it did state the sale would occur after 
August 31, 2004, and that there would be equal division of equity whenever the sale 
occurred. R0394 at pp. 7-8. The trial court further found that, based upon the way in which 
the parties filed their tax returns after signing the Divorce Agreement, this demonstrated the 
parties' intent to keep their finances separate. Id. at p. 9. The trial court found that the 
distribution of the 401-K and pension plans was contemplated by the Divorce Agreement, 
which indicates that they would be divided equally. Id. Furthermore, the Divorce Agreement 
disclaimed Veronica's right to seek alimony. Id. While the trial court noted that, while the 
Divorce Agreement did not make provisions concerning the distribution of personal 
property, including stock options, this failure did not take away from the Divorce 
19 
Agreement's enforceability, since it in large measure addressed the distribution of assets. Id. 
The trial court erred in its determination that the Divorce Agreement was a valid and 
binding contract between parties. The Divorce Agreement was either negotiated in bad faith 
or unreasonably constrained the trial court's equitable and statutory duties. Sweet at f 3. The 
parties, particularly Guenther, did not exercise good faith, honesty, and candor in negotiating 
the Divorce Agreement. Neither party was actually contemplating divorce when the Divorce 
Agreement was signed, which is evidenced by the record. Veronica did not see a divorce 
lawyer after signing the Divorce Agreement and was unaware whether Guenther had seen a 
lawyer. R0393 at p. 31. Veronica did not intend to divorce Guenther at the time she signed 
the Divorce Agreement. Id. Upon signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther was not 
contemplating divorce and did not move in that direction. R0393 at p. 198. In fact, 
Veronica's testimony that her underlying reason for the Divorce Agreement was to simply 
threaten divorce and, after doing so, Guenther treated her better. See, R0393 at p. 32. Since 
the parties, upon signing the Divorce Agreement, did not intend to divorce, the parties did 
not mutually assent their intent to be bound by the terms of the Divorce Agreement. Bunnell 
at 600. 
Furthermore, the failure of the parties to complete certain conditions precedent of 
the Divorce Agreement points to the Divorce Agreement's invalidity. Asael at H40. The 
Terra Vista Home was not placed for sale until after Veronica filed the Petition. See, Exhibit 
"B." Veronica detrimentally relied on one-half the equity as provided by the Divorce 
Agreement pursuant to 3.1 when the Terra Vista Home was sold. 
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Guenther then determined to retire the Terra Vista mortgage. His actions in failing 
to pay Veronica necessarily led to implication of paragraph 3.1 in the divorce proceedings, 
with a variable as to the amount of equity existing in the house and no provision for where 
the money originated with which the equity resulted. Guenther was not required to pay off 
the mortgage and did so of his own volition. 
Additionally, Guenther did not negotiate the Divorce Agreement in good faith. Sweet 
at TJ3. Guenther testified that his understanding of equity included what he considered to be 
premarital money, such as contributions and his inheritance. R0393 at pp. 194-195. However, 
he also testified that he did not discuss this with Veronica before signing the Divorce 
Agreement. Id. at p. 195. This omission in the negotiation of the Divorce Agreement should 
have compelled the trial court to decline to enforce it. Therefore, based upon the foregoing, 
the trial court erred in determining the Divorce Agreement as valid and binding on the 
parties. 
If the Divorce Agreement is not valid, then the trial court must determine division of 
marital assets based solely on the parties filing for divorce and subsequent separation, which 
would require a remand for findings consistent with this opinion. 
B. The Trial Court Erred by Construing the Divorce Agreement Against Veronica 
The trial court made a finding that any ambiguity in the Divorce Agreement would be 
construed against Veronica as the drafter. R0402. It is unclear whether this finding had any 
effect as the court did not note any ambiguity in its interpretation of the contract. Making 
this finding is counter to the court's statement "the Agreement drafted by Petitioner, with 
modifications provided by Respondent, is an enforceable contract . . ." R0385. The Court 
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also states that "because Petitioner essentially drafted the Agreement, any ambiguity should 
be resolved against her . . ." R0386. This ruling is error because A) the court's findings 
indicate that the document was mutually prepared, and B) this finding can only be made if a 
contract demonstrates an ambiguity which no other means can resolve, and no ambiguity 
was found by the court within this context 
"TJf a contract is ambiguous, it will be construed against the drafter only if extrinsic 
evidence fails to clarify the intent of the parties" Cherry v. Utah State University. 966 P.2d 866, 869 
(Utah App 1998) (emphasis added). This Court has stated, "[i]n other words, the doctrine of 
construing ambiguities in a contract against the drafter functions as a kind of tie-breaker, 
used as a last resort by the fact-finder after the receipt and consideration of all pertinent 
extrinsic evidence has left unresolved what the parties actually intended." Wilburn v. 
Interstate Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1988). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has determined, "[u]nder Utah law, an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing generally inheres [in] all contractual relationships." 
Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exchange. 2008 UT App 315, U36, 193 P.3d 650 citing 
Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 68, 1J27, 56 P.3d 524 (alteration in original) 
quoting Rawson v. Conover. 2001 UT 24, ^[44, 20 P.3d 876 (internal quotations omitted). 
This Court has clarified as follows: 
In Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269, the Utah 
Supreme Court recently clarified the proper approach to 
determining the issue of contractual ambiguity. The Supreme 
Court first noted that "contractual ambiguity can occur in two 
different contexts: (1) facial ambiguity with regard to the 
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the 
intent of the contracting parties." Id. ^25. A judge must first 
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determine that a contract is ambiguous on its face before it 
considers the second question of ambiguity regarding intent. See 
id. "[A] judge [may] ... review relevant and credible extrinsic 
evidence offered to demonstrate that there is in fact an 
ambiguity" on the face of the contract. Id. ^31. Once the judge 
reviews this evidence, "a finding of ambiguity [is justified] only 
if the competing interpretations are 'reasonably supported by 
the language of the contract.' Id. (quoting Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Assy 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995)). 
Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless. 2008 UT App. 405, ]f 12, 197 P.3d 659. 
"Importantly, the supreme court 'did not intend that a judge allow surrounding 
circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a contract would not otherwise 
permit/" Id. at ][13, citing Daines at ^ [27. 
The rule that language is presumptively within control of the party drafting the 
agreement and that ambiguities thereby are interpreted against the drafter is frequentiy 
described under the Latin term of contra proferentem, which literally means "against the offeror, 
he who puts forth, or proffers or offers the language." See, 11 Williston on Contracts §32:12 
(4th ed.). Because this doctrine presumes one offeror and an offeree and construes the 
language against the one who had the choice of words, it has long been held that 
"[c]ontracts. . .in which the parties thereto make mutual promises do not ordinarily come 
within this rule." Caine v. Hagenbarth. 37 Utah 69, 106 P. 945 (Utah 1910)(emphasis added), 
citing! Page on Contracts, § 1122. 
In the instant case, the trial court erred by construing the Divorce Agreement against 
Veronica. Exhibit "A" at p. 2. The trial court based this determination on the following 
findings: Veronica downloaded certain pro se online forms to petition for divorce but said 
forms were never filed. R0381. The Decree specifically states that, "Petitioner initially drafted 
23 
the Agreement and provided it to Respondent. He, in turn, proposed certain changes. After 
further negotiations Petitioner produced a final version, which the parties signed on May 14, 
2001 before a notary public." Id. 
The trial court erred by determining the Divorce Agreement should be construed 
against Veronica in any ambiguity because, while Veronica drafted the initial version, the 
contracts terms were unambiguous and the parties made adjustments to Veronica's version 
and mutually promised to undertake actions thereunder. See, Tr. at p. 191. In fact, Veronica's 
testimony was, "I initiated the draft, and Guenther finalized it." Tr. at p. 30. Therefore, the 
trial court's determination that any ambiguity should be construed against Veronica is 
erroneous due to the negotiation that took place before the Divorce Agreement was signed 
and notarized. Furthermore, the intent of the parties was made clear to the trial court: neither 
party intended to divorce at the time of signing the Divorce Agreement. Tr. at pp. 31 and 
198. Veronica's intent to sign the Divorce Agreement reflected that, after signing the 
Divorce Agreement, Guenther was nicer to her than before. Tr. at p. 32. The Divorce 
Agreement was mutually drafted and not ambiguous. 
II. EVEN IF THE DIVORCE AGREEMENT IS VALID AND BINDING, 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE AGREEMENT MAKE IT ERROR TO GIVE 
GUENTHER CREDIT FOR ADDITIONAL PAYMENTS MADE TO THE 
PROPERTY FROM WHATEVER SOURCE. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Offsetting the Proceeds 
The Divorce Agreement provided at its core that Veronica's name was to be taken off 
the loans for the Terra Vista property, but that her name would remain on the title. Then at 
some point in the future (after August 31, 2004), the property would be sold and Veronica 
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would receive the equity "divided equally," or in any event no less than $70,000.00. (Exhibit 
B, Trial Exhibit P-4). Under this contract, any payments made by Guenther to the loans on 
the property prior to its sale involving making payments to Veronica without regard to 
offset. Any other interpretation renders the Veronica's benefits under the contract 
illusory—she bargained for a situation where she would have no responsibility for any debt 
payments on the property, but she would still have full ownership in the property. 
What does she gain by keeping her name on the property, if payments made to the 
property are not treated as a gift to the marriage? What rationale can Guenther present for 
making additional payments on a house owned jointly by he and his wife, (to which she has a 
contract stating that she has no responsibility for the debt payments), with the Equity to be 
"divided equally upon property sale closure," and then claiming that he was not making a gift 
payments to a marital property? 3.1 says "Equity will be divided equally . . ." (Exhibit B, 
emphasis added). She waived her right to alimony under the Divorce Agreement—for what? 
For an equal share of any equity which accrued in the Terra Vista property, including an 
equal share of any payments Guenther made to the Terra Vista property. She is entitled to 
the benefit of her bargain. 
This Court has held, "[i]t is [a] court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as 
expressed in the plain language of the covenants." Holladay Duplex Management Co.. 
L.L.C. v. Howells. 2002 UT App 125, 117, 47 P.3d 104, citing Swenson v. Erickson. 2000 UT 
16, Ul l , 998 P.2d 807. Furthermore, [s]uch language is to be taken in its ordinary and 
generally understood and popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement 
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nor the words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon." 
Id., citing Freeman v. Gee. 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155,163 (1967). 
This Court has found, "[i]f the language within the four corners of the contract is 
unambiguous, then a court does not resort to extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, 
and a court determines the parties' intentions from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language as a matter of law." Young v. Wardley Corp.. 2008 UT App. 104,1J9, 182 P.3d citing 
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc.. 2002 UT 62, fL6, 52 P.3d 1179. The parties' 
intentions are controlling. State v. Ison. 2006 UT 26, 1J46, 135 P.3d 864 citing Bakowski at 
TJ16. Thus, "[t]he trial court is to consider "[e]ach contract provision ... in relation to all of 
the others, with a view to giving effect to all and ignoring none.'" Young at [^10 citing Plateau 
Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
This Court has previously determined, "[t]he rule is well settled that a person cannot 
recover back money which he has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all of the facts, 
without fraud, duress, or extortion in some form." Southern Title Guar. Co.. Inc. v. Bethers. 
761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App 1988), citing 66 Amjur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 93 
(1973). The Utah Supreme Court has found as follows: 
We have previously held that a trial court must consider many 
factors in making a property settlement in a divorce proceeding, 
but that the purpose of the settlement should not be to impose 
punishment on either party. Although the court ruled that 
"marital misconduct . . . should be considered in making an 
equitable division of property," it does not necessarily follow 
that the defendant was in fact in any way punished by the 
ultimate division made of the property. 
Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah, 1980) citing Read v. Read, 594 
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P.2d 871 (1979). 
Therefore, "[i]n making a property division, a court may properly consider such things as the 
length of the marriage and parties' respective contributions to the marriage." Id. citing English 
v. English. 565 P.2d 409 (1977). 
In the instant case, the trial court determined the Divorce Agreement was valid and 
binding upon the parties. Should this Court determine likewise, the trial court erred in 
offsetting the Proceeds resulting from the sale of the Terra Vista Home. Guenther testified 
that, between 2003 and June of 2005, he paid the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home in full. 
Tr. at p. 141. The trial court determined Guenther used money from his inheritance, 
bonuses, and incentives pay to retire the mortgage. R0337. 
The Divorce Agreement indicates the Terra Vista Home was required to be placed on 
the market and the sale was to take place after August 31, 2004. See, Exhibit "B". The equity 
was divided in one (1) of two (2) ways: "3.1 In the case of sale of the property: Equity will be 
divided equally upon property sale closure. 3.2 In the case of pay-out on September 1, 2004: 
Equity will be calculated based on property sale listing price (minus closing cost) at that time 
or $70K, whichever the greater amount will be paid out to Veronica by Guenther." Exhibit 
"B". 
Instead of opting to payout Veronica on September 1, 2004, Guenther instead made 
additional principal payments from 2003 to June 2005 to completely retire the mortgage. The 
trial court proceeded to enforce the Divorce Agreement and divided the Proceeds in 
accordance to 3.1 but offset the Proceeds in the process. The Trial Court did not divide the 
equity "equally upon property sale closure." The trial court neglected to consider Veronica's 
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contribution to the improvement, operation, preservation, and care of the property when she 
lived there in 2005-2006, after Guenther paid off the mortgage, another issue the Divorce 
Agreement does not contemplate. The trial court further erred by also neglecting to consider 
that Veronica's name was on the Terra Vista tide. Veronica reasonably believed that she was 
getting half of all equity and contracted her right to alimony against this sum. See Mortensen 
at 307. Therefore, considering the factors the trial court did not undertake concerning the 
offset, the trial court erred and prejudiced Veronica. 
Isaac who was seventeen (17) remained with Guenther in the Terra Vista Home while 
Veronica resided in Hong Kong, so as to finish high school. Id. The paperwork concerning 
Veronica's apartment in Hong Kong reflected she rented the unit from March 24, 2003, 
through August 1, 2005. Tr. at p. 24. Guenther visited Veronica in Hong Kong, staying with 
Veronica in the apartment. Tr. at p. 25. Veronica considered them to be husband and wife in 
the apartment. Id. Veronica also visited the states while residing in Hong Kong. Id. Veronica 
also provided the trial court with email correspondence exchanged between the parties while 
she was in Hong Kong. Tr. at p. 26. Veronica worked for the Asia division for two (2) years 
and seven (7) months. Tr. at p. 26. Veronica visited the states six (6) times during that time. 
Tr. at p. 27. Veronica decided to come back to Utah because she was lonely and wanted to 
be close to family. Tr. at pp. 27-28. Guenther expressed his concern that she would not have 
a job if she returned. Tr. at p. 28. 
Veronica testified that Guenther removed her name from the first mortgage, which is 
in accordance to the Divorce Agreement. Tr. at pp. 32-33. Veronica testified that Guenther 
moved back into the Terra Vista Home when she moved to Hong Kong in January of 2003. 
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Tr. at p. 34. Prior to moving to Hong Kong and Guenther moving back into the home, 
Veronica paid the utility bills and maintenance concerning the Terry Vista Home. Id. 
Veronica and Guenther shared the costs of any damage to the Terra Vista Home. Tr. at pp. 
34-35. Terra Vista was not put up for sale in 2004. Tr. at p. 35. The Terra Vista Home was 
put up for sale in November 2005, a month after Veronica filed for divorce. Id. Veronica 
testified that, since she had come back to the Terra Vista House without a job, Guenther 
told her to buy her own groceries and that he would not support her. Tr. at p. 42. The Terra 
Vista Home was sold on August 17, 2006, pursuant to an agreement between Veronica and 
Guenther. Tr. at p. 50. When the Terra Vista Home was placed for sale, both parties were 
living there. Id. 
After signing the Divorce Agreement, Guenther paid the taxes, insurance, and 
mortgage payment on the Terra Vista Home, even while Veronica lived there because she 
could not afford the mortgage. Tr. at p. 97. The Divorce Agreement reflects that Guenther 
would pay the mortgage of the Terra Vista Home. Tr. at pp. 97-98. Guenther testified that, 
in June, 2005, he paid in full the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. Tr. at p. 141. 
Accordingly as the trial court failed to take into consideration Veronica's improvement, 
operation, preservation, and care of the property while she resided there, the fact her name 
was on the title, and the fact that the Divorce Agreement did not contemplate Guenther's 
retiring of the mortgage, the trial court erred in offsetting the proceeds of the Terra Vista 
home. 
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B. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Guenther the Inheritance Monies he 
had Paid into the Terra Vista Home 
This Court has found, "[gjenerally, in a divorce proceeding "[e]ach party is presumed 
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." 
Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 UT App. 373,1J22, 993 P.2d 887 citing Thomas v. Thomas. 375 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25, 987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah Ct.App.1999). Yet, "[t]his presumptive rule 
of thumb, however, does not supersede the trial court's broad equitable power to distribute 
marital property, regardless of who holds title." Id. (citations omitted). Hence, "[a]n unequal 
division of marital property, however, is only justified when the trial court "memorialize[s] in 
commendably detailed findings" the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." 
Id. at |^27 (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined as follows concerning inheritance and divorce: 
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making "equitable" 
property division pursuant to [UT. CODE ANN. §] 30-3-5 should, 
in accordance with the rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions 
and with the division made in many of our own cases, generally 
award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance 
during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) 
to that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement 
of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts 
or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it, Dubois v. Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has been 
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges 
or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest 
therein to the other spouse. Cf. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 
(Utah 1980). 
Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) (alteration to 
original). 
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Thus, "[t]he remaining property should be divided equitably between the parties as in other 
divorce cases, but not necessarily with strict mathematical equality." Id. 
This Court has held, "Utah law provides that a spouse may transfer his or her interest 
in separately acquired property into the marital estate." Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App. 
373, 1J22, 993 P.2d 887 citing UT. CODE ANN. §30-2-3. Bradford continues, "[a] transfer of 
otherwise separate property to a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is generally 
presumed to be a gift, see 41 C.J.S. Husband and Wife § 103(a), at 397 (1991) {citing Kramer v. 
Kramer, 709 S.W.2d 157,159 (Mo.Ct.App. 1986)), and, when coupled with an evident intent to 
do so, effectively changes the nature of that property to marital property." Id., citing 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307-08 (Utah 1988). Mortensen continues: 
The rule that property acquired by gift or inheritance by one 
spouse should be awarded to that spouse on divorce unless the 
other spouse has, by his or her efforts with regard to the 
property, acquired an equity in it does not apply when the 
property thus acquired is consumed, such as when a gift or an 
inheritance of money is used for family purposes, In re Marriage 
of Metcalf 183 Mont. 266, 598 P.2d 1140 (1979); when the 
property completely loses its identity and is not traceable 
because it is commingled with other property (sometimes called 
transmuted), Wurman v. Wierman, [130 Wis.2d 425, 387 N.W.2d 
744 (Wis.,1986)]; Klingberg v. K/ingberg, [68 Ill.App.3d 513, 386 
N.E.2d 517 (IlLApp. 1 Dist, 1979)]; Agent v. Agent, 604 P.2d 862 
(Okla.Ct.App. 1979); or when the acquiring spouse places tide in 
their joint names in such a manner as to evidence an intent to 
make it marital property. Hussey v. Hussey, [280 S.C. 418, 312 
S.E.2d267 (S.CApp,1984)]." 
Mortensen at 307. 
This Court has stated that, when a spouse fails to meet the requirement for finding "that the 
other spouse's separate property has become part of the marital estate, an interest in a 
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spouse's separate property nonetheless may be awarded to the other spouse under an 
equitable division of property and in lieu of alimony, or in other extraordinary situations 
where equity so demands." Child v. Child. 2008 UT App 338,11100,194 P.3d 205. 
In the instant case, the trial court awarded Guenther $241,465.52 from the Proceeds 
before attempting to equitably distribute the Proceeds between the parties. Exhibit "A" at p. 
3. The Court states, "Respondent will receive the first $241,465.52 from the proceeds, 
representing the extra payments made by Respondent to retire the mortgage on the residence 
after the parties separated their finances in May 2001, and one-half of the cost of repairs to 
the Residence, prior to the division of the sales proceeds." Id. The trial court found, "[a]fter 
the parties separated their financial accounts in May 2001, Respondent made extra payments 
on the Residence. Those payments were made from moneys received by Respondent as 
bonuses, incentive pay, and /or an inheritance. Through those payments (made by 
Respondent between June 2003 and June 2005), Respondent was able to retire the mortgage 
on the Residence (approximately $230,000)." R0377. Hence, "[h]e should be credited with 
the full value of those extra payments before equity in the Residence is allocated to the 
parties." Id. Guenther's Inheritance totaled approximately $45,000. 
The trial court erred by awarding the Inheritance used by Guenther to retire the 
mortgage back to Guenther. While parties are entitled to all of his/her separate property and 
fifty percent of the marital property in a divorce proceeding, the Inheritance became marital 
property when Guenther paid it into the Terra Vista mortgage. Bradford at ^[22. The trial 
court erred in its determination. Id. 
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The findings concerning the Gingerwood Home state, "[f|or her part Petitioner 
argues that once Respondent placed her name on the title to the Kearns house he effectively 
"gifted" her with one-half interest in the property. Moreover, Veronica argues that since the 
money from the sale of the Kearns house was used to purchase their new Residence, those 
funds have been so co-mingled as to lose any separate status as a premarital asset." R0370. 
Hence the trial court concluded as follows: 
When Respondent placed Petitioner's name on the title to the 
Kearns house, he effectively gifted Petitioner with one-half the 
value of that home, irrespective of the fact that he had paid for 
it in full before the marriage. No evidence was presented 
identifying exactly when Respondent took this action, or the 
reasons for why he did so. No evidence was presented to 
suggest that Petitioner's name on the tide to the Kearns house 
was a necessary prerequisite for securing the mortgage to 
purchase another building lot. After the mortgage on the Kearns 
house was secured, the evidence indicates that the parties paid 
that obligation with funds from the joint account into which 
both of their salaries were deposited. When the Kearns house 
was sold the proceeds were used by the parties to build their 
new marital Residence. The court concludes that through gifting 
and co-mingling of funds used to pay the mortgage, the Kearns 
house lost its character as Respondent's premarital property. 
Therefore, the Court concludes that the proceeds realized from 
the sale of the Kearns house became a marital asset which was 
subsequently reinvested in the Residence — another marital 
asset. 
R0385. 
Concerning the Inheritance, the trial court concluded that, even though Veronica 
claimed signing authority on the "joint account" into which Guenther deposited the 
Inheritance, the Inheritance was Guenther's sole and separate property. R0390. Thus, the 
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trial court determined he should receive full credit for using the Inheritance towards 
payments the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. Id. 
The trial court neglected to realize the Inheritance became co-mingled and marital 
property by its being paid into the mortgage. Guenther used the Inheritance to contribute to 
the enhancement and maintenance of the Terra Vista Home and, by paying the Inheritance 
into the mortgage, the Inheritance lost its identity because it was "gifted" to Veronica in the 
same way as the Kearns property. See, Mortensen at 308. Guenther testified that as of June, 
2005, he paid in full the mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. R393 -Tr. at p. 141. 
Guenther essentially transferred his interest in the Inheritance into the Terra Vista 
Home, the marital estate. Bradford at ^[22. This "transfer" was separate property until 
Guenther paid the Inheritance into the Terra Vista Home, wherein the resulting equity was 
to be divided equally between the parties. Id. Hence, the Inheritance became marital 
property. Id. Veronica obtained an interest in the Inheritance when it was paid into the 
mortgage because the equity resulting therefrom was to be divided equally between the 
parties. Id. at 307. The Terra Vista Home was clearly marital property (Veronica was still on 
the title at the time of the sale of the Terra Vista Home) and Guenther's intent to keep the 
Inheritance separate is moot when the Inheritance was co-mingled with equity resulting from 
the sale of the Terra Vista Home. Id. Furthermore, the Divorce Agreement was intended to 
award Veronica a substantial sum so as to negate the need for alimony. Veronica was found 
to have given up claim for alimony pursuant to the Divorce Agreement; however, she 
detrimentally relied upon the Proceeds to obviate the need for alimony. Therefore, as the 
Divorce Agreement expressly provides for the Proceeds to be equally divided, the trial court 
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erred by awarding Guenther back the Inheritance, particularly when the Inheritance was 
gifted to Veronica and co-mingled among funds that were intended to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING GUENTHER EQUITY IN 
THE TERRA VISTA HOME MADE PURSUANT TO THE DIVORCE 
AGREEMENT FOLLOWING ITS SIGNING UP TO AND INCLUDING 
THE SALE OF SAID PROPERTY; IN AWARDING HIM INTEREST ON 
THE PROCEEDS HELD IN ESCROW OF THE TERRA VISTA 
PROPERTY; and IN ENTERING CONFLICTING FINDINGS 
REGARDING THE SEPARATION OF THEIR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Guenther the Equity Up to and 
Including the Sale of the Terra Vista Home 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury ... the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . ." UT. R. ClV. P. 52(a). The 
findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is 
supported by, die evidence.'" Bailey v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, 1124, 18 P.3d 1129, citing 
Butler. Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 P.2d 225, 231 
(Utah 1995)(citations omitted). 
This Court has determined, "[a] trial court's findings should fit 'within the framework 
of the petition as originally drawn, or as amended' and should be supported by the evidence 
presented." Lee v. Sanders. 2002 UT App. 281, f7, 55 P.3d 1127 citing In re Behm's Estate. 
117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 663 (1950). The Utah Supreme Court has found as follows: 
In regard to the matter of the sufficiency of findings of fact, a 
substantial compliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, is sufficient, and findings of fact and conclusions of 
law will support a judgment, though they are very general, where 
they in most respects follow the allegation of the pleadings. 
Findings should be limited to the ultimate facts and if they 
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ascertain ultimate facts, and sufficiently conform to the 
pleadings and the evidence to support the judgment, they will be 
regarded as sufficient, though not as full and as complete as 
might be desired. 
Pearson v. Pearson. 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977) (footnotes 
omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held, "[t]he trial court, in an equity, as well as in a 
law, case, should itself assume the labor of making specific findings of fact which respond to 
and dispose of the material issues; and in an equity case, where that has not been done, we 
may reverse and remand[.]" Munsee v. McKellar. 39 Utah 282, 116 P. 1024, 1027 (Utah 
1911). 
"Generally, in a divorce proceeding '[ejach party is presumed to be entitled to all of 
his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property.'" Bradford v. Bradford. 
1999 UT App. 373, ]|26, 993 P.2d 887 citing Thomas v. Thomas. 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25, 
987 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah Ct.App.1999). Hence, "[ajn unequal division of marital property, 
however, is only justified when the trial court 'memorialize[s] in commendably detailed 
findings' the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." Id. at \ 27. "[Although 
the trial court could make an award of marital property that was weighted in favor of the 
spouse that did not also have separate property, such a division should be based on an 
'equitable rationale' set forth in the findings of fact and conclusions of law." Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker. 2008 UT App 11, H21,176 P.3d 476. 
In the instant case, the trial court determined the Divorce Agreement was a valid and 
binding contract. The trial court awarded Guenther equity in the Terra Vista Home made 
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pursuant to the Divorce Agreement following its signing up to and including the sale of the 
Terra Vista Home. The Judgment awards $241,465.52 to Guenther, which includes the extra 
payments made to retire the mortgage and one-half the cost to repair the Terra Vista Home 
for its sale, after the separation of the parties' financial accounts in May 2001. Exhibit "A" at 
p. 3. Veronica raises the issue of the Inheritance being awarded back to Guenther herein and 
further raises issue with Guenther being awarded back monthly mortgage payments 
following the signing of the Divorce Agreement up to and including the sale of the Terra 
Vista Home, particularly when the Divorce Agreement plainly states, "Guenther will be 
responsible for the mortgage and equity loan payments on the Terra Vista property through 
the end of August 2004." Exhibit "B". The trial court's award of monthly mortgage 
payments to Guenther direcdy contradicts its determination that the Divorce Agreement is 
enforceable, notably since the Divorce Agreement does not provide for such an award. See, 
Exhibit "B". 
The trial court found, "Respondent assumed full responsibility for the mortgage and 
Petitioner's name was removed from that obligation. Respondent continued to pay the 
mortgage on the Residence from the time the parties entered into the Agreement until the 
mortgage on the Residence was paid off by Respondent in June 2005. Nevertheless, 
Petitioner's name remained on the tide to the Residence until it was sold on or about the 
Summer, 2006." R0383. 
The Terra Vista Home was sold on August 17, 2006, pursuant to an agreement 
between Veronica and Guenther. Tr. at p. 50. When the Terra Vista Home was placed for 
sale, both parties were living there. Id. 
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Veronica is presumed to be entitled to fifty percent of the marital property without 
the Divorce Agreement in place. Bradford at 1126. However, the Divorce Agreement 
provides she is entided to half the equity in the Proceeds and Guenther was to pay the 
monthly mortgage on the Terra Vista Home. The trial court determined the Divorce 
Agreement to be enforceable and then entered an unequal division of the Proceeds without 
sufficient findings in support thereof. Id. at H27. Furthermore, the FOF/COL do not set 
forth an equitable rationale to support such a Judgment on this issue. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Guenther the Interest Accrued on 
the Proceeds of the Terra Vista Home while in Escrow. 
In addition, the trial court awarded Guenther all of the interest accrued on the 
Proceeds throughout the pendency of the action. Exhibit "A" at p. 3. The trial court states, 
"[f)urther the party claiming the interest on the escrow account shall be awarded any interest 
which accrued on the escrowed sales proceeds." Id. At trial, Guenther did not calculate 
interest accumulating on the Proceeds since it had been placed in escrow but acknowledged 
Veronica was entitled to her portion of it. Tr. at p. 147. The trial court's FOF/COL do not 
set forth findings or conclusions concerning the interest accruing on the Proceeds. Little 
evidence was introduced at trial concerning it, except for Guenther's testimony that, while he 
had not calculated the interest, Veronica was entitled to her portion of it. Tr. at p. 147. 
However, the Judgment awards all of the interest to the party claiming it, which was 
Guenther. Exhibit "A" at p. 3. This award of the interest evidences the trial court was not 
acting according to its equitable duties. 
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The FOF/COL do not set forth an equitable rationale concerning the interest on the 
Proceeds. Stonehocker at 1121. The FOF/COL do not comply with the standard set forth by 
UT. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The Judgment awards the interest to Guenther without support in the 
FOF/COL, as this award does not follow logically from and is not supported by the 
evidence, particularly when Guenther testified Veronica was entided to her portion of the 
interest. Bailey at 1124; see, Tr. at p. 147. The Judgment simply states, "[fjurther the party 
claiming the interest on the escrow account shall be awarded any interest which accrued on 
the escrowed sales proceeds." Exhibit "A" at p. 3. Thus, since the Judgment does not rest 
upon adequate findings and conclusions concerning this issue, the FOF/COL in this case are 
insufficient and warrant remand for further findings thereon. Pearson at 1082 and Munsee at 
1027. 
Furthermore, as the Proceeds were marital property, Veronica is presumed to be 
entided to fifty percent of the proceeds, which was set forth by the Divorce Agreement. 
Bradford at 1J26. Interest was not contemplated by the Divorce Agreement; however, as the 
interest would be included in the Proceeds, Veronica was entided to half the Proceeds, which 
would include interest thereon. However, since Veronica was not awarded accordingly, the 
trial court was required to memoralize in detailed findings the exceptional circumstances 
supporting such a distribution to Guenther. Id. at 1f27. Such findings are not found in this 
case with regards to this issue. Furthermore, the equitable rationale which are presumed to 
be found within the findings are also absent in this case. Stonehocker at 1J21. Therefore, 
remand is appropriate for further findings on this issue which are supported by the evidence 
given at Trial. 
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C. The Trial Court Entered Conflicting Findings Concerning the 
Separation of the Parties5 Financial Accounts 
Veronica clearly testified that the financial accounts were not "divided" in May 2001, 
but that they were "separated," so they each had their own accounts. R0393 - tr. p. 84,11. 1-
3, 15-17. Aside from her testimony, Veronica submitted the actual bank account statements 
in her post-trial motions to demonstrate that the money in the accounts was never divided, 
but just that each party began using one account as a primary account. R0412-16; 0426-44. 
She also submitted this evidence in an objection to Proposed Findings of Fact prior to the 
court's entry of the same. R305-306. No allocation of the parties' funds never actually 
occurred in 2001. 
The trial court determined the parties separated their financial accounts as of May 25, 
2001. Exhibit "A" at p. 2. In its findings, the trial court found the following: 
The parties initially separated on or about May 2001. Between 
May 2001 and March 2006 the parties spent extended periods of 
time in separate households, but have also spent some together. 
For example, Petitioner relocated to Hong Kong in January 
2003, but her son remained at the house with Respondent 
pursuant to the terms of a "Divorce Agreement" the parties 
negotiated in February 2001. Moreover, during the Petitioner's 
time in Hong Kong the parties continued to put themselves 
forward as husband wife, they traveled and vacationed together, 
visited each other periodically, and Petitioner returned to Utah 
to care for Respondent when he underwent surgery; she 
remained here for a substantial period of time providing for his 
care. After Petitioner returned to the United States from Hong 
Kong she lived at the Residence until it was sold in August, 
2006. It is not clear from the evidence at trial exactly when 
Respondent left the Residence permanently after Petitioner 
returned from Hong Kong. 
R0371-0372. 
40 
However, this finding conflicts with the evidence produced at trial. 
Veronica received approximately $6,000 from the sale of her home in Alabama. 
R0393 - Tr. at p. 10. Veronica placed the funds in a joint account she had begun to share 
with Guenther. Tr. at p. 11. Veronica and Guenther had joint checking and savings 
accounts, which Guenther controlled. Tr. at p. 20. 
Veronica testified that, after Guenther moved out in April 2001, she saw him at the 
Terra Vista Home once ever weekend or more. Tr. at p. 36. Guenther visited Veronica in 
Hong Kong, staying with Veronica in the apartment. Tr. at p. 25. Veronica considered them 
to be husband and wife in the apartment. Id. Veronica also visited the states while residing in 
Hong Kong. Id. Veronica also provided the trial court with email correspondence exchanged 
between the parties while she was in Hong Kong. Tr. at p. 26. Veronica visited the states six 
(6) times while living in Hong Kong. Tr. at p. 27. Veronica decided to come back to Utah 
because she was lonely and wanted to be close to family. Tr. at pp. 27-28. Veronica testified 
that, although they were separated, she and Guenther had relations; whenever they went out 
they presented themselves as husband and wife, and took vacations together. Tr. at p. 37. 
Veronica testified that, when Guenther traveled with Veronica on her business trip to Korea 
in February 2004, she introduced him as her husband to her family. Tr. at p. 39. Veronica 
took vacation time in October 2004 to assist Guenther when he had open heart surgery. Tr. 
at pp. 40-41. 
Veronica ceased depositing her paychecks into the joint accounts on May 25, 2001. Id. 
However, both parties had access to the other's accounts. Id. Guenther would withdraw 
from Veronica's account and reimburse her for it. Tr. at pp. 84-85. Veronica was not placing 
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money into the joint account after moving to Hong Kong although her name remained on 
the accounts. Tr. at p. 86. Veronica acknowledged she did not deposit money into the joint 
accounts before withdrawing $29,000 and did not seek permission from Guenther before 
doing so. Tr. at pp. 86-87. Veronica testified her reason for withdrawing from the $29,000 
was to pay debts. Tr. at p. 87. Veronica testified it would be appropriate for Guenther to 
withdraw a similar sum from her bank account because the parties' names were on their 
bank accounts, joint and individual. Id. Veronica considered the money she earned after May 
25, 2001 to be marital money. Tr. at pp. 88-89. While Veronica was living in Hong Kong, 
Guenther would withdraw money from her individual account to pay for expenses incurred 
by Isaac. Tr. at p. 93. Guenther had no access to Veronica's account in Hong Kong. Tr. at p. 
101. 
In April 2001, Guenther testified that the parties split their marital monies 50% to 
each party by transferring funds from accounts. Tr. at pp. 139-140. Guenther testified that, 
after this time, Veronica's last paycheck deposited to the joint account was then transferred 
to her individual checking account. Tr. at p. 140. After signing the Divorce Agreement, 
Veronica took care of her obligations. Id. Guenther testified he gave Veronica notice when 
he was transferring monies from her account to his. Tr. at pp. 140-141. Guenther testified 
that, although the parties had separated their financial accounts upon entering the Divorce 
Agreement, both parties had access to the other's accounts. Tr. at pp. 216-217. Guenther 
testified he believed their personal property was split by splitting bank accounts on April 14, 
2001. Id. No documentation was presented that indicated the parties had separated their 
accounts in May 2001. 
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Veronica filed post-judgment motions requesting the Judgment be altered. Veronica 
pointed out therein that the trial court did not indicate how the interest would be divided on 
the Proceeds in its F O F / C O L . R0478. In response to Veronica's post-judgment motions, 
Guenther requested the interest be awarded solely to him, which it had been in the 
Judgment. Id. Guenther produced an email from Veronica to him, which indicated he was to 
have the interest on the Proceeds; however, this document was not produced until after 
Trial. R0511. 
The F O F / C O L does not show that the Judgment follows logically from and is 
supported by the evidence concerning the division of the parties' financial accounts. Bailey at 
1124. Both parties retained signing rights on the other's accounts. Furthermore, this issue was 
disagreed upon at Trial and neither party could produce evidence that such division actually 
took place on May 25, 2001. Therefore, as the Judgment does not follow logically from and 
is not supported by the evidence, the F O F / C O L are insufficient on this issue. Id. 
Furthermore, the parties' disagreement at trial concerning the date of financial separation 
without evidence to support their individual contention is not sufficient evidence to support 
findings and consequendy a Judgment the date of financial separation occurred on May 25, 
2001. Lee at ]f7. Since the evidence does not support the F O F / C O L , the trial court's specific 
findings thereon cannot dispose of material issues. Munsee at 1027. Therefore, remand is 
also appropriate on this issue to determine the evidence to support its findings. The trial 
court made an unequal division of marital property and relied on its erroneous date to 
determine the division of financial accounts. Braford at f26. Furthermore, the detailed 
F O F / C O L on this issue relied on erroneous evidence which cannot support exceptional 
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circumstances to support the unequal division of property. Id. at f 27. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN USING THE NEW VALUES (INSTEAD 
OF DEPRECIATED VALUES) FOR MAJOR HOUSEHOLD ITEMS and THE 
2002 VW GOLF IN ORDERING VERONICA TO PAY GUENTHER ONE HALF 
THE VALUE OF THOSE ITEMS. 
A. Major Household Items. 
Guenther at trial testified that he considered the current value of the washer and 
Dryer to be $824, (half of purchase price); the TV $1,010, (half of purchase price); and the 
current value of the Dining Set $3,450.00, 75% of purchase price, based on his experience 
with depreciation. (Tr. PI59-161). These values and Guenther's estimates were stated in 
Respondent's Exhibits 1C, IK, 2W, 3B, and 31 (all duplicates), and total $5,284.00, of which 
Veronica should pay half, or $2,642.00. Guenther also included the original receipts for the 
washer/dryer, TV, and Dining set as exhibit IK and 31 (attached), which showed original 
purchase prices of the washer and dryer for $1,648.32 on 4/19/00, Sony TV receipt for 
$2,020.54 on 4/24/00, and the Dining Set for $4,599.64 on 4/24/00. 
The trial court rejected the current values (for January 2007) testified to and 
submitted by Guenther, and instead chose to simply use the year 2000 purchase price of a 
nearly 7-year-old TV, washer/dryer, and dining room set, with a total of $8,268.50, ordering 
that Veronica should pay half, or $4,134.25. R377-78; R403; R407. This was an abuse of 
discretion; the Decree should be direcdy modified to reflect the only current value testified 
to for these items ($5,284.00), with Veronica being ordered to pay $2,642.00 for her share. 
B. The 2002 VW Golf 
The Trial Court found that "as to the value of the 2002 VW Golf, the only evidence 
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presented to the Court was the value listed by [Veronica] in her 2005 financial declaration. 
At trial [Guenther] also adopted the value reported by Petitioner as an appropriate measure 
of the vehicle's value." R378. This 2005 Value was $10,275.00, of which Veronica was 
ordered to pay half, or $5,137.50. R. 404, 407. 
The only trial testimony concerning the value of the 2002 Golf was the following 
statement by Guenther: 
Then the Golf 2002 which is a little bit - it's not - I took 50% 
of the estimates submitted by the petitioner. The petitioner 
claimed for and got the right to use the Golf since hr return in 
August 2005 from Hong Kong. Then I think it's fair to use the 
value we have closest to this date, and not of today. 
R0393-tr.R160,ll. 5-10. 
The court's statement concerning the only submitted value of the 2002 Golf being 
Veronica's 2005 Financial Declaration is simply a case of Guenther substituting his judgment 
for the Court's in a proposed order which the court adopted. Veronica submitted an 
updated sworn Financial Declaration for Pretrial dated September 29, 2006, which listed the 
current value of the Golf as $6,588, which was marked as Petitioner's Exhibit 26. While 26 
was apparently not admitted as evidence, Petitioner's Exhibit 13 (attached) was admitted as 
evidence, which also listed the current value of the Golf as $6,588.00. Guenther included a 
note in his Exhibits IK and 31 that he believed the $10,250.00 value from Veronica's 2005 
Financial Declaration should be used. Interestingly Guenther also admitted his own sworn 
Financial Declaration as evidence, dated September 22, 2006, in which Guenther swore 
under oath that the value of the 2002 Golf was $8,950.00. (Respondent's Exhibit 8, attached) 
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Since the Trial Court's findings indicated that it had no evidence of the Golfs value 
other than Veronica's 2005 Financial Declaration (which was not admitted), the trial court 
clearly disregarded the evidence presented by Guenther that he valued the Golf at $8950, and 
Veronica's evidence that she valued it at $6588.00. Again it would be an abuse of discretion 
to use a two-year-old value not submitted as evidence, instead of using either of two values 
submitted within four months of the trial date. This issue should be* remanded to the trial 
court to enter a value of the 2002 Golf conforming to the evidence actually submitted by the 
parties as to its current value. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
"A party seeking to recover attorney fees incurred on appeal shall state the request 
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award." Strauss v. Tuschman. 2009 UT 
App 215, 1J12, 216 P.3d 370; UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9). Veronica was awarded partial 
attorney fees by the trial court pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-3(1), based upon the fact that 
Guenther was in a better position financially to assist with her attorney's fees, and that she 
was partially successful in her claims. R0278. "Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were 
awarded below to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that 
party on appeal." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Veronica 
accordingly requests an order for costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal, 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 30-3-3(1), as the prevailing party on this appeal. In addition, the trial 
court should reassess the amount of its fee award in light of additional areas of success as a 
result of this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court 
reverse the trial court in this matter, remand for further findings consistent with this opinion, 
enter orders for property division where the evidence is uncontroverted, and award attorney 
fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this XL. day of Ai~T2009. 
David S. Pace 
Attorney for Appellant 
47 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy, postage pre-paid, of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant on this \ / day of . 2009 to the 
following: 
Mr. Terry R. Spencer 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9 
Sandy Utah 84070 
David S. Pace 
Attorney for Appellant 
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tr i Z::B 
TH'RC rJ 
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TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D., P.C.. #6335 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Respondent 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9 
Sandy, Utah 84070
 E N T E R ^ D !f <! REG'STRY 
Telephone: (801) 566-1884 
Fax:(801)562-5151 
DATE. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
GUENTHER JACOBSEN, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 054905684 
Judge: Lindberg 
Commissioner Casey 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER came before the Court on the 31st day of January 
2007, for trial, before the Honorable Denise Lindberg, District Court Judge, and the Court having 
heard the testimony of the parties, and having received into evidence documents from both parties, 
and having heard the proffers of counsel and based thereon, and having reviewed the written 
arguments of both parties and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and based thereon and for good cause appearing therefore; 
Decree of Divorce ( 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED. 
1. The parties are hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce, on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences, dissolving the bonds of matrimony previously existing between the parties, the same to 
become final upon signing by the court and entry by the clerk. 
2. Petitioner's clam to Respondent's inheritance is categorically rej ected and Petitioner 
shall have no claim to Respondent's inherited monies, including those monies used to retire the 
mortgage on the former marital residence (the "Residence.") 
3. The Divorce Agreement is hereby deemed to be a valid and enforceable contract and 
any ambiguity shall be resolved against Petitioner, as the drafter. Petitioner has waived any claim 
to alimony, now or in the future, and no alimony shall be awarded to Petitioner. 
4. May 25,2001, shall be the date used for the purpose of separating the joint financial 
accounts previously held by the parties. Respondent is hereby awarded the $29,777.29 wrongfully 
removed from Respondent's account. This sum shall be drawn from Petitioner's share of the sales 
proceeds from the Residence. 
5. January 31,2007 shall be used as the date of valuation for Respondent' s stock options 
accumulated during the marriage and each party shall receive one-half of the value of the stock 
options as of that date. 
6. January 31,2007 shall be used as the date of valuation for the parties' pensions plans, 
401(k) plans and/or other retirements. Petitioner shall be awarded one-half of the $68,829.64 
withdrawn from Respondent's 401 (k) plan and Respondent shall receive one-half of the $12,000.00 
cashed out of Petitioner's retirement. Petitioner shall receive an offset of $28,414.82 from the 
monies she is ordered to pay Respondent from her share of the sales proceeds of the Residence. 
7. The balances of the parties' defined contribution retirement accounts, and 
Respondent's defined benefit account shall be divided equally pursuant to property prepared 
QDROs. 
8. The date of sale (August 2006) shall be used for the date of division of equity in the 
Residence. The sales proceeds were placed in escrow and shall be paid to the parties upon 
presentation of a signed copy of this Decree of Divorce as follows: 
a. Respondentwillreceivethefirst$241,465.52 from the proceeds, representing 
the extra payments made by Respondent to retire the mortgage on the residence after the parties 
separated their finances in May 2001, and one-half of the cost of repairs to the Residence, prior to 
the division of the sales proceeds. Further, the party claiming the interest on the escrow account 
shall be awarded any interest which accrued on the escrowed sales proceeds. 
b. The remaining sales proceeds ($247,483.59) shall be divided between the 
parties, equally, and, prior to the distribution of those funds, the following amounts shall be 
transferred to the respective party's balance as follows: 
i. Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $29,777.29, from her one-
half of the sales proceeds, representing the monies Petitioner wrongfully removed from a joint 
account used solely by Respondent; 
ii. Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $4,134.25, from her one-
half of the sales proceeds, representing Respondent's one-half interest in the maj or personal property 
retained by Petitioner; 
iv. Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $5,137.5, from her one-half 
of the sales proceeds, representing Respondent's one-half interest in the value of the VW Golf 
vehicle (as reported by Petitioner in her December 2005 financial declaration); 
v. Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $2,117.50, as set forth on 
the affidavit of fees filed by Respondent's counsel, representing the attorney's fees incurred by 
Respondent in bringing to the court's attention Petitioner's wrongful removal of monies from 
Respondent's account. 
vi. Petitioner shall pay Respondent the sum of $ 14,417.21, from her one-
half share of the sales proceeds, representing Petitioner's pre-marital debt paid by Respondent as set 
forth in footnote 2 of the Court's Findings of Fact; 
vii. Respondent shall pay Petitioner the sum of $47,256.35, from his one-
half share of the sales proceeds, representing Petitioner's one-half interest in the parties' retirement 
accounts and stock options; and 
viii. Respondent shall pay Petitioner the sum of $2,500.00, from his one-
half share of the sales proceeds, representing a contribution to Petitioner's attorney's fees. 
c. The escrow agent is hereby ordered to disburse the escrowed sales proceeds by 
issuing a check to Petitioner in the amount of $ 117,914.3 8 and a check to Respondent in the amount 
of $371,034.72, plus any interest remaining in the account as of the date of disbursement, as more 
specifically set forth on Exhibit A attached hereto. 
9. Each party shall be awarded any and all other assets or debts in his or her individual 
name free and clear of any claim or responsibility of the other party. 
10. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver any necessary documents to 
transfer or affirm the title and ownership of the personal property of the parties, including 
automobiles, pursuant to the Decree entered in this matter. 
11. Petitioner is awarded her name change to Veronica HyunJoo Lee. 
JOHN GREEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DATED: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be served on 
a true and correct copy to: 
John Green 
Attorney at Law 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 60 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the $i day of July, 2008. 
Civil No. 
054905684 Table of Contents Exhibit A 
Amount To Petitioner Respondent FF/CL 
Terra Vista Home Proceeds $ 488,949.11 
County Tax (R's Duty) NOT IN FF/CL $ 0.00 
Less 1/2 Repairs $ (3,808.04) $ 0.00 $ 3,808.04 27 
Extra Principal Payments $ (237,657.48)$ 0.00 $ 237,657.48 # 1 2 B 
Respondent's Pre-Marital Funds NOT IN FF/CL 
A) Subtotal Escrow Allocation $ 0.00 $ 241,465.52 
To be Divided Equally $ 247,483.59 $ 123,741.79 $ 123,741.80 
Dining Table Set $ 4,599.64 $ (2,299.83)$ 2,299.82 # 1 2 C 
Sony TV $ 2,020.54$ (1,010.27)$ 1,010.27 # 1 2 C 
Washer& Dryer $ 1,648.32 $ (824.16)$ 824.16 # 12 C 
Subtotal Furnishings $ 8,268.50 $ (4,134.26)$ 4,134.25 # 1 2 C 
2002VWGolf $ 10,275.00 $ (5,137.50)$ 5,137.50 # 1 2 C 
Petitioner's Premarital Debts $ (14,417.21)$ 14,417.21 #10 
Petitioner's Withdrawals $ (29,777.29) $ 29,777.29 24 
Attorney Fees (to P) $ 2,500.00 $ 2,500.00 $ (2,500.00) 30 
Attorney Fees (to R) $ (2,117.50)$ 2,117.50 31 
B) Subtotal Reimbursements $ (53,083.76) $ 53,083.75 
R's Stock Options $ 37,692.05 $ 18,846.03 $ (18,846.03) # 1 2 D 
R's After-Tax 401k $ 68,820.64 $ 34,410.32 $ (34,410.32) # 12 E 
P's FMC A/P (AIA Plan) $ 12,000.00 $ (6,000.00)$ 6,000.00 # 1 2 E 
C) Subtotal Stock Options* 401 (k) Pay-outs $ 47,256.35 $ (47,256.35) 
$ 488,949.10 $ 117,914.38 $ 371,034.72 
Exhibit ~B~ 
Divorce Agreement 
Between 
Guenther and Veronica Jacobsen 
1. Take Veronica's name off the mortgage and equity loan for the 2043 Terra Vista 
property by the end of 2001, but keep both names on the property title. 
2. Veronica and Isaac have the right to live in the Terra Vista property until the end of 
August 2004. 
2.1. Guenther will be responsible for the mortgage and equity loan payments on the 
Terra Vista property through the end of August 2004. 
2.2. Veronica will be responsible for the utility bills and the maintenance of and the 
replacement parts for the Terra Vista property. 
2.3. Repair costs for the property shall be shared equally. Each party will be 
responsible for damages whoever caused them. 
3. Put the Terra Vista property on the market earliest in May 2004. Sale of the Terra 
Vista property shall take place after August 31st, 2004. The equity will be divided 
equally as follows: 
3.1. In the case of sale of the property: 
Equity will be divided equally upon property sale closure. 
3.2. In the case of pay-out on September 1s t , 2004: 
Equity will be calculated based on property sale listing price (minus closing cost) 
at that time or $70K, whichever the greater amount will be paid out to Veronica 
by Guenther. 
4. Veronica can stay in the Terra Vista Property beyond August 2004, until the property 
sale is finalized or pay out is completed. After August 2004, mortgage and equity 
loan payments will be shared in the ratio of actual gross income. 
5. Income tax return will be filed jointly until divorce and divided equally. 
6. Upon divorce, the 401 (k) and/or pension plans of both parties for the duration of the 
marriage shall be divided equally. 
7. Veronica shall not seek for the alimony. 
Exhibit ~C~ 
TERRY R. SPENCER, Ph.D, P.C.. #6335 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney for Respondent 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 9 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 566-1884 
Fax: (801) 562-5151 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 
VERONICA LEE JACOBSEN, FINANCIAL DECLARATION 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
Case No. 054905684 
GUENTHER JACOBSEN, Judge 
Respondent. Commissioner T. Patrick Casey 
Name: Guenther Jacobsen 
Address: 6934 Well Spring Road, Apt. 9C, Midvale, Utah 84047 
SSN: 647-32-8883 
Occupation: Chemist 
Employer: Hexcel Corporation, 7000 West 5400 South, West Valley, Utah 84118 
No. of Exemptions Claimed: 2 
Birth date: 7/2/47 
1. GROSS MONTHLY INCOME: 
Salary/Wages: $ 10,071.27 
TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME: $ 10,071.27 
2. ITEMIZE MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS: 
Federal Income Taxes 
State Income Taxes 
FICA 
Medicare 
Health Insurance 
401 (k) 
Disability and Life Ins. 
TOTAL MONTHLY DEDUCTIONS 
3. NET MONTHLY INCOME 
4. DEBTS AND OBUGATIONS 
Creditor's Name For 
Am Ex 71003 ' Living Exp. 
Zions VISA Living Exp. 
Am Ex (corp) Business 
5. PROPERTY-Sold 
a. Real estate: Marital Residence Sold 
Address: 
Date of acquisition: 
Original Cost: 
Mortgage Balance: 
Mortgage Holder: 
Monthly Payment: 
Other Liens: 
Monthly Payment: 
Current value: 
Basis of Valuation: 
b. Vehicles (Year, make and model) 
2002 Volkswagen Golf GLS 
1996 Chrysler (pre-marital) 
:NONE 
In whose 
Name 
Rsp. 
Rsp. 
Rsp. 
$2,108.92 
579.10 
486.70 
146.03 
406.97 
1,666.67 
168.84 
$5,563.23 
$4,508.04 
Balance Mo. Pmt. 
$4,637.55 In foil each month 
$ 35.15 In foil each month 
$1,395.45 In foil each month 
Value Balance 
Owed 
8,950.00 0.00 
3,000.00 0.00 
2 
Cash and Deposit accounts (banks, savings & loans, credit unions-savings and checking) 
Name of Institution Account No. Current Balance 
Zions 123-32922-9 
Zions 123-60519-8 
Escrow Account-Home Sale 
9,109.60 
10,010.85 
488,949.11 
Securities, stocks, bonds, money market funds (other) 
Name of Institution Account No. 
Hexcel Stock Options (pre-marital) 005291 
Checking 
Savings 
Current Value 
$0.00 
Business Interests None 
Name of Business Shares Current Value 
f. Other assets (include value or equity) None 
6. PROFIT SHARING OR RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS -
(If more than two accounts, attach sheet with identical information) 
Petitioner: Name of Company/Plan name: Fresenius 
Plan representative: Fidelity 
Address: P. O. Box 5425, Cincinnati Ohio 
Current value: $300,810.97 (estimate, excludes A-Tax) 
Respondent: Name of Company: Hexcel Corporation; 40 l(k); Pension Plan (frozen 12/31/00) 
Plan representative: Fidelity Investment; 
Address: P. O. Box 5424; Cincinnati, OH 45250 
Current value: Pension $280.67 per month (estimate) 
7. LIFE INSURANCE 
Name of Company Policy No. 
Hexcel 
8. MONTHLY EXPENSES: 
Rent/Mortgage: 
Real property taxes 
Real property insurance 
Maintenance 
Housekeeping 
Food and Household Supplies 
Utilities: 
Electricity 
Face Amount 
$290,000 
$ 1,129.00 
0.00 
19.00 
0.00 
60.00 
400.00 
Cash Value (if any) 
$0.00 
30.00 
3 
Natural Gas 
Water, Sewer & Garbage 
Telephone: (cell included and Internet) 
Cemetery Expense 
Cable TV 
Laundry and Dry cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical 
Dental 
Entertainment 
Gifts and donations 
Auto expense (gas, oil, maint.. 
Auto insurance 
Installment payments: 
Attorney's fees 
Vacation and Personal Travel 
Car replacement cost 
TOTAL EXPENSES: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
, tax, license) 
Expenses 
75.00 
45.00 
120.00 
40.00 
32.14 
50.00 
200.00 
125.00 
90.00 
100.00 
100.00 
300.00 
77.00 
0.00 
845.00 
500.00 
400.00 
$4,812.14 
I swear that all of the information contained herein is true and correct. 
Responds 
Subscribed and sworn to before Ae this , c f o / day of^U(^X 2006. 
MJfft 
NOTARYP 
"" ""Notary Public . 
W State of Utah j 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I employed by the offices of Terry R. Spencer, Ph.D., Attorney and 
Law, counsel for Petitioner and that I caused the foregoing to be served upon Respondent by placing 
a true and correct copy in a sealed envelope, addressed to: 
John C. Green 
John C. Green, P.C. 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 60 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and depositing the same in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid thereon, on thec^jday 
of September, 2006. 
HEXCEL 
2005 EARNINGS SUMMARY 
| WAGE ANALYSIS 
[Total Gross Earnings 
[ Group Term Life Ins Over SOK 
Sec. 401(k), 403(b) and 457 
Pretax Healtb, FSA & Transportation 
Relocation/Moving Expense 
Other Exempt Earnings/Deductions 
EDCA, PARS and RSUs 
Excess Social Security Wages 
• 2005 REPORTED WAGES: 
EARNINGS 
REGULAR 
REGULAR-INDIRECT 
VACATION 
SICK 
HOLIDAY 
PERSONAL HOLIDAY 
MICP 
STOCK OPTION GAIN 
LTIP AWARD 
TOTAL EARNINGS: 
Box 1 Wages Box 3 Wages 
198,469.79 
-18,000.00 
-37655.04 
177,414.75 
55,883.39 
52,101.97 
5,984.65 
1,772.17 
4,64830 
464.83 
27,138.00 
33,492.48 
16,984.00 
198,469.79 j 
198,469.79 
-3,055.04 
-105,414.75 
90,000.00 
Box 5 Wages 
198,469.79 
-3,055.04 
195,414.75 j 
DEDUCTIONS | 
HEALTHCARE 
| HEXCEL PRETAX 401K 
1 HEXCEL AFTERTAX 401K 
HEXCEL PRETAX 401K 
ANTHEM PPO HIGH-FLEX 
DELTA DPO-FUEX 
1 VSP HIGH-FLEX 
JEE SUPPLIES 
! FAMILY SUPP AD&D- NO 
-STOCK OPTION OFFSET 
48.90 1 
14,000.00 
2,789.00 
4,000.00 
2,672.75 
293.35 f 
40.04 
1,713.40 
167.96 
22,289.23 
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS: 48,014.63 | 
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WEEK ENDING: 
ADVICE NUMBER: 
09/10/2006 
00130591 
gpBOTtotn *IACQBSEW m? r 
TcURRENTl nrpE 
IEGULAH 
lOi^AY 
lib-' 
,tCK 
'ACATION 
Ttf> 
72,00 
8.001 
RATEl 
58.10 
58.10 
CURRENT 
4,183.45 
464.83 
YEAR TO DATE 
67,574.32 
3,710.84 
4,508.83 
13.717.00 
9,534.79 
4,503.02 
10,946.00, 
TYPE 
FED IT 
MEDICARE 
UTSIT 
80CSEC 
•FSA*H 
•401KCU 
•MEDICAL 
•DENTAL 
•VISION 
•401K 
LTDEE 
UfEEE 
ADM) fAM 
401XAT 
CURRENT 
802.77 
64.88 
231.68 
60.00 
743.72 
113.08 
11.43 
3.23 
18.73 
54.73 
6.48 
YEAR TO DATE 
23,224.82 
1,739.07 
6,371.55 
5.840.40! 
1,140.00 
2.974.90| 
2,148.14 
217.17 
81.37 
15,000.00 
317.87 
1,039.87 
122.74 
278.90] 
\TE: 09/15/2006 ITOT. GROSS 4,048.28 123.502.601 TOTAL DEDUCTIONS 2,108.49 60,476.60 
ccel Corporation 
:2627 
*_-m, SC 29622 
ADVICE NUMBER: 
ADVICE DATE: 
00130591 
09/15/2000 
ADVICE INFORMATION ONLY! 
GUENTHER JACOBSEN 
6934 WELL SPRING RD *9C 
MIDVALE , UT 84047 
& » R ^ B K ^ 
ACCOUNT & TYPE 
I 123329229 2J0N CX 
| TOTAL DIRECT DEPOSIT 
AMOUNT I 
2.539.791 
2.539.79 ] 
WAKNJNGJ - THE 0ACK OF THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS AN ARTIROAl WATERMARK. - HOWAJANANGIE TO VIEW. 
VOID 
Exhibit ~D~ 
Statement of Income and Expenses 
Income 
Gross Monthly Income from: 
'Salary ] 
Total Montly Income:| 
[Monthly Deductions: 
| Federal wlthhelding 
OASDI 
(Medicare 
State w/hUT 
[401 (k) I 
| Total monthly deduction: 
| Net Monthly Income: 
! $4,583.00! 
j $4,583.00 
$744.66 
$284.16 
$66.45 
$266.67 
I $0.00 
[ $1,361.95 
| $3,221.06 
Debts 
Creditor's 
\AME)C~ 
Isaac Moanres 
Purpose ot 
Debt 
Living cost 
Property Down 
In whose 
name 
Petitioner's 
Petitioner's 
BaTance 
Payment 
$535.86 
$5,083.79 
Monthly 
In full 
$0.00 
Property 
[Address: 
pate of acquisition: 
Original cost: 
Mortgage balance: 
Mortgage holder: 
Monthly Payment: | 
Other liens: 
Lien holder: 
Monthly Payment: 
Current value: 
Basis of evaluation: 
|1365East Emerson Ave I 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
August 10th, 2006 
$330,000.00 
$266,820.23 
Countrywide Home Loans 
$1,800.00 
$33,750.00 
Countrywide Home Loans 
$230.00 
$330,000.00 
Recently purchased | 
Vehicle (Year, Maker, & Model) [Value (Balance owed 
2002 Volkswagen Golf ~ ] $6,588.00 j $O00i 
[Cash and deposit accounts 
Name of Institution [Account No. [Current Bal. 
JZion's Checking [003468360 | $749.33 
401 (K) 
EM Assist, Inc 
Paychex 
http.V/benefits.pavchex.com 
Current Value: $6,543.00 
Fresenius Medical Care 
Fidelity Investments 
P.O. Box 5424 
Cincinnati, OH 45250-5424 
Current Value: $40,539.99 
Pharmacia Savings Plan 
Fedelity Investments 
P.O.Box 770003 
Cincinnati. OH 45277-0065 
Exhibit ~E 
ZIONS BANK 
P.O. Box 30709, Salt Lake City, UT 34130-0709 
0 
Statement of Accounts 
Page 1 of 3 
This Statement October 7, 2004 
Last Statement September 9,2004 
Primary Account 003448370 
0003196 02 AV 0.503 "AUTO T5 0 2208 84093-106443 02 1 ZFN PG0023 00012 
GUENTHERJACOBSEN 
VERONICA L JACOBSEN 
2043 TERRA VISTA WAY 
SANDY UT 84093-1064 
llnLUIU.Lnll l l l t l l l lM I I II...LI.I..MI.U.I 
DIRECT INQUIRIES TO: 
24-hour Account Information: 
Logan: 755-9995 
Ogden: 393-9995 
Provo: 375-9995 
Salt Lake. 974-6800 
St. George: 674*9995 
1 (800) 974-8800 (outside local 
WE HAVENT FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ® 
Broadway Office 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2105 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT BALANCE 
Account Type 
Gold Interest Checking 
£^1112^*1!": "" 
Account Number 
003448370 
CheckinglStvfngs 
Ending Balance f 
$11,024.52 / 
Outstanding 
Balances Owed 
GOLO INTEREST EHi(^IIBfl(»tt8a» 
Previous Balance 
10,424.76 
10 DEPOSITS/CREDITS 
Date 
09/17 
09/22 
09/23 
09/24 
09/27 
09/27 
09/27 
09/27 
10/01 
10/07 
Amount 
2,461.93 
9,610.65 
15,763.35 
2,578.79 
1,734.00 
286.87 
248.77 
209.10 
2,461.92 
1.98 ' 
Deposits/Credits ChaigesJDebits Checks Processed 
35,357.36 4,144.42 30,613.18 
Description 
HEXCEL CORPORATI PR PAY 0002- REF # 011900448111680 1103320859 
WIRE/IN-200426603835;ORG ZIONS BANK DUE FROM DEUTSCHE BANK;0 1603203350 
DEPOSIT 0050418094 S f c o c U f l p / i ' w j 
DEPOSIT 0060525751 * ~~ 
INTERNET XFER FROM DDA "*8360 ID: 271184721 2307014386 
INTERNET XFER FROM DDA ***8360 ID: 271184833 2307014392 
INTERNET XFER FROM DDA ***8360 ID: 271185051 2307014404 
INTERNET XFER FROM DDA *"8360 ID: 271184936 2307014402 
HEXCEL CORPORATI PR PAY 0002- REF # 011900444184263 1104377420 
INTEREST PAYMENT 0001144454 
70S *2 
Ending Balance 
11,024.52 
10 CHARGES/DESKS 
Date 
09/13 
09/14 
09/14 
09/20 
09/22 
09/27 
09/27 
10/01 
10/04 
10/04 
Amount Description 
37.79 ATT 800-222-0300 AT&T S 2311084462001 REF # 021000022961697 1104907529 
1,236.98 AMERICAN EXPRESS ELEC R 040913060225228REF # 031201460568055 1104050603 
30.00 INTERNET XFER TO DDA *"0425 ID: 258164614 2305206283 
30.59 QWEST COMM AUTO PAY 68019444718050 REF #071100265555994 1104925041 
8.00 WireFee 1603203349 
600.00 INTERNET XFER TO DDA ***1764 ID: 271185334 2307014407 
14.10 Questar Gas Co. QGC 989285000007831 REF # 091000011369389 1104245122 
2,000.00 Countrywide MORTGAGE REF #021000027198986 1104461858 
149.83 BANKCARD CENTER PAYMENT JACOBSEN.VERONICA LEE 4388790000917 1104029512 
37.13 PACIFICORP ELECTRIC C 036082947001040REF # 021200025403450 1104008443 
ZIONS BANK* 
P.O. Box 30709, Sail Lake City, UT 84130-0709 
0002873 01 AV 0.278 **AUTO T1 2 1912 84093-106443 02 ZFN PG0023 00005 
GUENTHER JACOBSEN 
VERONICA L JACOBSEN 
2043 TERRA VISTA WAY 
SANDY UT 84093-1064 
ll,.l..lMlll...l.ln..il....llll.H.ll...i,.l.l..l..ll.l..l.l 
WE HAVENT FORGOTTEN WHO KEEPS US IN BUSINESS. ® 
Statement of Accounts 
Page 1 of 3 
This Statement: July 8,2005 
Last Statement: June 8,2005 
Primary Account 003448370 
DIRECT INQUIRIES TO: 
24-hour Account Information: 
Logan: 755-9995 
Ogden: 393-9995 
Prove: 375-9995 
Salt Lake: 974-8800 
St. George: 674-9995 
1 (800) 974-8800 (outside local 
Broadway Office 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2105 
I i i | . 1 • - • T — 1 1 • " - ' ' i n i • • l i — | i •—•• - • • t • • • < • 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT BALANCE 
Account Type 
Gold Interest Checking 
Ch*ckmglS*vings Outstanding 
Account Number Ending Balance BaianctsOwed 
003448370 $6,158.09 
GOLD INTEREST CHECKING 003448370 ' 
Previous Balance 
4,979.70 * 
7 DEPOSITS/CREDITS 
Date Amount 
06/09 19,589.23 
WRG 2,595.58 
06/24 2,595.58 
06/24 860.79 
07/05 2.87 
07/08 2.595.58 
07/08 4.16 
10 CHARGES/DEBITS 
Date Amount 
06/13 39.92 
06/15 2.477.90 
06/20 32.04 
06/27 78.65 
06/28 376.13 
07/01 300.00 
07/05 3Z38 
07/05 19.95 
07/08 7,199.84 
07/08 77.99 
3 CHECKS PROCESSED 
Number Date 
1083 06/13 C/w\JLtr 
DAILY BALANCES 
Date Amount 
06/09 24,568.93 
06/10 27,164.51 
06/13 10.874.66 
705 « 
Deposits/Credits Charges/Debits Checks Processed Ending Balance 
28,243.79 10,634.80 16,430.60 
Description 
DEPOSIT 0050257848 Sto&U Og+touS 
HEXCELCORPORATI PR PAY 0002-REF#011200363457166 1104718238 
HEXCEL CORPORATI PR PAY 0002- REF # 011200365481085 1104216265 
HEXCEL CORPORATI INV PA E86415 REF # 011200366358688 1104221721 
DEPOSIT 0050453471 
HEXCEL CORPORATI PR PAY 0002- REF # 011200361357307 1105009930 
INTEREST PAYMENT 0000965407 
Description 
ATT 800-222-0300 AT&T S 2311084462001 REF # 021000029782701 1107845520 
AMERICAN EXPRESS ELEC R 050614060215815REF # 031201464022903 1104672441 
QWEST COMM AUTO PAY 68019444718050 REF # 071100269882967 1104517497 
Questar Gas Co. QGC 989285000087541 REF # 091000011373511 1105246495 
AMERICAN EXPRESS ELEC R 050627060218184REF # 031201462115079 1104650447 
INTERNET XFER TO DDA ***1764 ID: 182182341 2306512608 
PACIFICORP ELECTRIC C 036082947001050REF # 021200022398827 1106316626 
8ANKCARD CENTER PAYMENT JACOBSEN.VERONICA LEE 4388790000917 1106358772 
INTERNET XFER TO DDA *"1764 ID. 189181255 2304610538 
COMCAST COMCAST 4040160066 REF # 021000024407417 1105032487 
.... Amount Number Date Amount Number Date 
16,249.93 1084 07/07 46.67 1085 07/08 
06/15 8,396.76 06/27 
06/20 8,364.72 06/28 
06/24 11,821.09 07/01 
6,158.09 
134 00 
11,742.44 
11,366.31 
11.066.31 
